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Abstract
We assess the impact of the euro on ﬁnancial integration. We document how the
single currency has re-shaped ﬁnancial markets and international investment patterns.
We address the macroeconomic implications of enhanced ﬁnancial integration, with
a particular focus on the shift in net capital ﬂows and the extent of international risk
sharing. Finally, we outline the challenges posed by increased ﬁnancial integration
for the ECB and other European policymakers.
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The ﬁnancial system provides the central link between the issuers of currency and the
real economy. Accordingly, an evaluation of the response of the ﬁnancial system to the
introduction of the euro is centrally important in assessing the economic impact of monetary
union. To this end, this paper seeks to provide an overview of the ﬁnancial impact of the
euro, with a particular focus on the macroeconomic implications of enhanced ﬁnancial
integration.
To the extent that the euro has contributed to ﬁnancial integration, this plays a dual
role in the economics of monetary union. First, the eﬃciency gains from ﬁnancial devel-
opment contributes positively to the net welfare gains that accrue from the formation of
the monetary union. Second, to the extent that ﬁnancial integration improves the macro-
economic coherence of the monetary union, it endogenously helps the euro area to fulﬁll
the criteria for an optimal currency area. In what follows, we consider both aspects of the
inter-relation between monetary union and ﬁnancial integration.
It is important to appreciate that it is not straightforward to establish the impact of
the euro on ﬁnancial integration. In particular, the last decade has also been a period in
which the pace of global ﬁnancial integration has accelerated, such that the impact of the
euro cannot be considered in isolation. Moreover, there has been considerable progress
in promoting ﬁnancial integration across the European Union, not just within the euro
area. Finally, within countries, there have been policy moves to attack historic barriers
to regional ﬁnancial integration. In each of these cases, the introduction of the euro has
been a central motivating factor in driving reform. However, at the same time, it would
be excessive to attribute the full impact of these innovations to the euro. For instance,
the improvements in telecommunications technology have been an important driving force
behind international ﬁnancial integration, while non-euro member countries (most notably,
the United Kingdom) have also been key actors in the promotion of a single market in
ﬁnancial services across the European Union.
Beyond the direct impact of monetary union on ﬁnancial systems, it is important to
assess how ﬁnancial integration has aﬀected macroeconomic behaviour in the euro area.
At the aggregate level, enhanced ﬁnancial development may have boosted the level of
area-wide potential output, in view of the well-established connection between ﬁnancial
development and economic growth. In addition, ﬁnancial development may also contribute
to a lower level of macroeconomic volatility, through a range of mechanisms. To the extent
that the euro has fostered enhanced global ﬁnancial integration, it may also have increased
the interdependence between the euro area economy and the rest of the world. From
the perspective of an individual member country, monetary union may have altered the
economics of net capital ﬂows, the relation between domestic activity and domestic asset
prices and the scope for international risk sharing.
Finally, the structural economic changes associated with the transformation of the ﬁ-
nancial system has posed challenges for the European Central Bank and other European
policymakers. In relation to the execution of monetary policy, the transmission mechanism
has been altered by ﬁnancial integration. Moreover, as has been vividly illustrated by the
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terms of the management of ﬁnancial turmoil and the maintenance of ﬁnancial stability.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out a conceptual
framework for thinking about the impact of monetary union on ﬁnancial integration. We
turn to the empirical evidence on the extent of ﬁnancial integration in Section 3. The
macroeconomic impact of ﬁnancial integration is analysed in Section 4, while Section 5
discusses the outstanding policy issues and oﬀsers some concluding remarks.
2 One Money, One Financial System
As was widely discussed in the ex-ante debate on monetary union, the replacement of
independent, national currencies by a common, single currency was expected to re-shape
ﬁnancial markets, ﬁnancial institutions and the behaviour of investors and asset creators.
Most directly, a single currency should promote deeper and more liquid markets for
monetary assets. Portes and Rey (1998) emphasise the network characteristic of ﬁnancial
markets - a greater take-up of a currency improves liquidity and thereby increases the at-
tractiveness of that currency for ﬁnancial transactions, which in turn increases usage of
that currency and further propels a virtuous circle of greater liquidity and declining trans-
actions costs. Furthermore, the creation of deep and liquid markets also makes a monetary
union a more attractive destination for external investors. In similar fashion, it makes the
single currency a potentially attractive vehicle currency for international asset trade even
between buyers and sellers that are not resident in the monetary union, permitting a fur-
ther expansion in the size and scope of ﬁnancial markets (Papaioannou and Portes 2008a,
2008b). In turn, the scaling up of ﬁnancial markets increases the payoﬀ to ﬁnancial inno-
vation and asset creation (Martin and Rey 2001). A wider range of ﬁnancial products can
be supported by a larger-scale ﬁnancial system and the incentive to capitalise oﬀ-market
income streams is enhanced.
Another useful framework is provided by Coeurdacier and Martin (2007) who propose
that the adoption of a single currency combines aspects of preferential and unilateral ﬁ-
nancial liberalisations. In particular, within the monetary union, a single currency reduces
transactions costs but also increases the elasticity of substitution between assets issued by
member countries. Accordingly, the net eﬀect is ambiguous: a decline in transaction costs
should increase cross-border holdings, while the increase in the elasticity of substitution
reduces the scope for diversiﬁcation. For non-members, the creation of a monetary union
reduces the transaction cost of investing in the monetary union, relative to the cost of
transacting in multiple legacy currencies.
Moreover, by eliminating intra-area exchange rate risk, monetary union may also pro-
mote integration in equity-type markets and in foreign direct investment. Especially for
the smaller, peripheral member countries, the interest rate environment of a monetary
union should be more stable relative to a small, open economy that may be vulnerable to
the vicissitudes of international capital ﬂows and the episodic risk of currency crises. In
addition, the currency markets of small economies may suﬀer from illiquidity, resulting in
2higher average interest rates relative to more liquid markets.
For investors, the expanded menu of assets and the impact of a single currency on the
matrix of returns will plausibly reduce the degree of home bias. At one level, the elimination
of exchange rate risk and the decline in intra-area transaction costs should promote cross-
border investment within the monetary union. However, there will also be an increased
incentive to invest in destinations outside the monetary union, in view of the limited scope
for diversiﬁcation within a monetary union.
The creation of a monetary union will also alter the organisational structure of the
ﬁnancial system. For banks, monetary union increases the range of potential counter-
parties in a uniﬁed inter-bank market, while also creating a new regime in terms of access to
the resources of the monetary authority. While potentially raising the level of competition
within the monetary union, there is also an incentive for entry by externally-resident banks
that may have a competitive advantage in realising the opportunities provided by a larger
market. Financial integration should also expand the menu of ﬁnancial options for non-
banks. At least for larger ﬁrms, a deeper and more liquid bond market enables these ﬁrms
to reduce reliance on bank ﬁnance by having the option to issue corporate bonds. For
all ﬁrms, increased competition in the banking sector should reduce the cost of capital and
improve the quality of ﬁnancial services.
Monetary union will also aﬀect both sides of the balance sheet of households. By
reducing home bias, households should be able to hold a more diversiﬁed portfolio of assets,
with a greater proportion taken by cross-border holdings. On the liability side, all else
equal, we may expect to see an increase in the gross indebtedness of households to the extent
that the removal of liquidity premia in interest rates, more intense competition between
banks and greater direct or indirect access to cross-border funds relaxes credit constraints.
Finally, monetary union also aﬀects the ﬁnancial environment of national governments,
since a deeper area-wide bond market reduces risk premia and improves opportunities to
issue debt in home currency.
In the next section, we turn to a quantitative assessment of the degree to which EMU
indeed delivered on the promise of greater ﬁnancial integration.
3 The Impact of EMU on Financial Integration
In this section, we provide an overview of the evidence concerning the impact of EMU on
the ﬁnancial integration of the euro area. Since the extent of ﬁnancial integration may be
expected to vary across thet diﬀerent sectors of the European ﬁnancial system, we organise
the analysis into a sector-by-sector tour of the evidence.
3.1 Debt Markets
Between 1999 and 2007, Figure 1 shows that the unsecured money market was highly
integrated, with the creation of the euro leading to a near-complete convergence in key
indicators such as the overnight lending rate. Similarly, the rates on longer-maturity inter-
3bank unsecured lending also rapidly converged across the euro area. Diﬀerences in national
legal systems in the treatment of collateral remain a barrier to full integration in the secured
money markets but Table 1 shows that the share of cross-border counterparties in the
secured markets has largely converged with the share in the unsecured markets (European
Central Bank 2008a). In turn, the integration of swaps and future markets is signiﬁcantly
higher than the cash-based markets, reﬂecting the greater concentration in the derivatives
markets among larger, more sophisticated institutions. However, the short-term securities
markets are the least-integrated component of the money markets: a basic obstacle to a
uniﬁed short-term securities market has been the diversity in norms and deﬁnitions in the
design of short-term securities contracts.1
However, as documented by Cassola et al (2008), the 2007/2008 turmoil has led to
increased segmentation in the euro area money market. Asymmetric information problems
have been a central feature of the malfunctioning of the money markets. This has led to
a two-tier market structure, with the larger banks possessing the highest credit standing
active in the cross-border money markets whereas smaller banks are conﬁned to trading
with domestic counter-parties. The segmentation is reﬂected in pricing data, with interest
rates on cross-border inter-bank lending lower than on domestic inter-bank lending. As the
moneymarkets return to morenormal conditions, wemay expect the degree of segmentation
to decline even if it does not fully return to pre-turmoil levels.
As with the money markets, the level of general integration in the longer-term debt
securities markets has been impressive. For sovereign debt, spreads across member govern-
ments are small relative to pre-EMU patterns and can be related to diﬀerences in liquidity
properties and credit risk. Although spreads are reasonably low in the government bond
market, the eﬃciency and liquidity of that market is constrained by diﬀerences in the is-
suance practices of the member countries (Dunne et al 2006, European Commission 2008).
For corporate debt, spreads can be related to sectoral and ﬁrm-level characteristics, with
no important role for country-level factors (Baele at al 2004).2 In relation to liquidity, Bi-
ais et al (2006) show that the liquidity of euro-denominated bonds is superior to Sterling-
or dollar-denominated bonds, which can be attributed to an open and competitive area-
wide market in which a large number of banks oﬀer dealership services to a wide array of
prospective buyers. Moreover, these authors ﬁnd that bid-ask spreads on euro-denominated
corporate bonds increase with maturity and default risk and decrease with trade size.
The deeper market has in turn stimulated a remarkable increase in the scale of bond
issuance by corporations. Figure 2 shows a steep increase in the volume of securities
1To this end, the Short-Term European Paper (STEP) initiative has been launched by the Financial
Markets Association (ACI) and the European Banking Federation (EBF) and is heavily backed by the
Eurosystem. The STEP Market Convention grants the STEP label to securities that meet its criteria for
information disclosure, documentation, settlement and statistical information and STEP-labelled securities
have gained in popularity over the last two years; the outstanding stock of STEP-labelled securities stood
at €342 billion by August 2008.
2The current ﬁnancial crisis shows that the bonds issued by banks represent an important exception,
in view of the role of national governments in resolving solvency and liquidity problems in relation to the
liabilities of banks.
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EMU. As is emphasised by Pagano and von Thadden (2004), the growth in the volume of
corporate bond issues can be in part attributed to the euro, in relation to the contribution
of the single currency to the increase in competition among underwriters, which led to
a substantial reduction in issuance costs and improved access for smaller and higher-risk
ﬁrms. That bonds from across the euro area are viewed as increasingly close substitutes
is evident from the composition of cross-border bond portfolios. Figure 3 shows that the
share of bond issues held by investors in other euro areas has grown from 10 percent in
1997 to nearly 60 percent in 2006.
The development of the bond market has beneﬁted from the growing international role
of the euro. Many non-resident entities have issued euro-denominated securities, adding to
the depth and liquidity of the euro market. Table 2 shows the share of the euro in the total
international debt securities outstanding for a selection of major non-EMU economies at
the end of 2007 relative to the share of the euro’s legacy currencies in total debt outstanding
at the end of 1997. The increase in the share of the euro has been quite striking for most of
the countries in Table 2. Bobba et al (2007) conﬁrm this pattern in an econometric study
of the determinants of currency choice in the denomination of international securities and
ﬁnd that the euro gained market share relative to the legacy currencies upon the formation
of EMU.
At the aggregate level, Lane (2006b) investigates whether the pattern of cross-border
bond investment has been inﬂuenced by the introduction of the euro. Following the speciﬁ-
cation developed byLane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008a), the pattern of bilateral bond positions
is modeled as
log(Bij) = αi + αj + βEMUij + σZij + εij (1)
where Bij is the stock of country j’s bonds held by country i, (αi,αj) control for source-
and host-country ﬁxed eﬀects and EMUij is a 0-1 dummy that takes the value 1 if both i
and j are members of the euro area and 0 otherwise. The set of control variables Zij include
a host of bilateral characteristics such as EU membership, bilateral exchange rate volatil-
ity, bilateral trade, distance and other gravity-type variables that are plausibly correlated
with joint EMU membership. Even controlling for these factors, this study ﬁnds that com-
mon membership of the euro area doubles the level of pairwise cross-border bond holdings
relative to other country pairs in a levels speciﬁcation for the year 2004 and by (85,125)
percent in a ﬁrst-diﬀerences speciﬁcation that examines changes in portfolios between 1997
and 2004. In an extension of this approach, Pels (2008) estimates repeated cross-sections
for each year 2001 through 2006 and ﬁnds that the estimated β is quite stable across these
years, with the interpretation that the adjustment of bond portfolios to the creation of the
euro was essentially complete by 2001.
Coeurdacier and Martin (2007) explore a slightly-altered speciﬁcation
log(Bij) = αi + β1EMUij + β2EMUj + σ1Zij + σ2Zj + εij (2)
where the host-country ﬁxed eﬀects (the αj vector) are dropped and a host of country-j
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which takes the value 1 if the destination country is a member of the euro area and 0
otherwise. While the exclusion of host-country ﬁxed eﬀects runs the risk of conﬂating
an EMU eﬀect with other general characteristics of euro area countries, this alternative
speciﬁcation has the virtue of enabling an estimation of the impact of the euro on the
bond portfolios of non-member countries. Indeed, these authors ﬁnd that both β1 and
β2 are signiﬁcantly positive: while EMU has the greatest positive impact on the level of
bond holdings between two members of the euro area, it also raises the level of euro area
bond holdings by non-member countries. As postulated by Coeurdacier and Martin, a
reasonable interpretation is that EMU works as a combination of a preferential ﬁnancial
liberalization (being disproportionately beneﬁcial to the members of the monetary union)
and a unilateral ﬁnancial liberalization (increasing the attractiveness of euro area assets to
all investors, regardless of origin).
3.2 Portfolio Equity
To the extent that a single currency reduces transaction costs and ameliorates risk, it is
also possible that EMU may facilitate the integration of equity markets. Regarding risk,
it is not so clear that nominal exchange rate uncertainty should be a major factor in the
determination of optimal equity portfolios, in view of the low covariance between exchange
rate movements and the excess return on home equity versus foreign equity, relative to
the variance of excess returns (Adler and Dumas 1983, Van Wincoop and Warnock 2007).
However, there may be regulatory and institutional factors that increase the importance
of the currency regime for equity decisions. For instance, many investment funds operate
under guidelines that limit the extent of foreign-currency risk that may be taken on. More-
over, even if the covariance between the exchange rate and equity return diﬀerentials is
low during normal periods, it is plausible that this covariance increases during periods of
sharp economic dislocation, such that a long-term investor that seeks to limit exposure to
catastrophic events may have a preference for domestic-currency holdings.
At the aggregate level, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) ﬁnd that common membership
of the euro area substantially increases the level of pairwise cross-border portfolio equity
holdings by about 67 percent, even controlling for a host of other determinants of bilateral
investment positions. A similar result for equities is also obtained by Coeurdacier and
Martin (2007), who also ﬁnd evidence that the level of equity investment by non-members
into the euro area has also increased. Related evidence is provided by De Santis and
Gerard (2006) who compute the shift in portfolio weights between 1997 and 2001 and ﬁnd
a substantial euro eﬀect, especially for those countries with very limited levels of cross-
border exposure in the pre-EMU period. Similar to her results for bond holdings, Pels
(2008) ﬁnds that the estimated eﬀect is stable across the years 2001 through 2006. Again,
the interpretation is that the adjustment of equity portfolios to the euro was essentially
complete by 2001.
The euro has also altered the dynamic structure of equity returns. Financial globalisa-
tion has led to an increasing role for a global factor in determining national equity returns.
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of the global factor in determining European equity returns - in eﬀect, the single currency
has facilitated the globalisation of the investor base for European equity returns. Baele
and Inghelbrecht (2008) also show that the volatility of the country-speciﬁc element in eq-
uity returns has declined. In related fashion, Fratzscher and Stracca (2008) show that the
response of national equity indices to national shocks (such as electoral surprises or major
disasters) has declined for members of the euro area. The muted response of national equity
returns can be related to the elimination of a major historical source of return volatility
– that is, country-speciﬁc monetary innovations – and the absorptive capacity of an in-
ternational investor base in coping with idiosyncratic shocks. Rather, market sentiment is
now largely determined at a European level, with a lesser role for national factors.
3.3 Foreign Direct Investment
Direct investment represents a key channel for cross-border ﬁnancial integration, through
cross-border mergers and acquisitions and greenﬁeld investments. Moreover, once a direct
investment is established, all subsequent ﬁnancial transactions between parent and aﬃliate
(whether equity or debt) are classiﬁed as direct investment. In principle, this category also
includes cross-border investments in residential and commercial property, which anecdotal
evidence suggests has grown strongly in recent years. Finally, in examining the geographical
distribution of FDI, it is important to bear in mind the prevalence of ‘transhipment’ FDI
ﬂows in which ﬁnancial centres are intensively used as locations for holding companies,
corporate headquarters and special purpose entities for reasons of organisational and tax
eﬃciency (Taylor 2007).
Several studies have found a signiﬁcantly positive euro eﬀect in the determinants of the
bilateral pattern of FDI. Petroulas (2007) studies FDI ﬂows over 1992-2001 in a gravity-type
framework and ﬁnds that common membership of the euro area raises bilateral ﬂows by 16
percent. In addition, FDI from member countries to non-members is boosted by 11 percent
and from non-members to members by 8 percent. He ﬁnds that the eﬀect is strongest for
FDI ﬂows between two members of the euro area but there is also evidence of an increase in
FDI into the euro area from non-members. De Sousa and Lochard (2006) study the impact
of EMU on the geographical distribution of FDI stocks over 1982-2004 and estimate that
the euro has increased FDI stocks between member countries by 26 percent.
Aviat et al (2008) emphasise the contribution of the euro to the expansion in M&A ac-
tivity is conﬁned to the manufacturing sector, while these authors do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
euro eﬀect for M&A in the services sector. As argued by the authors, this may be related
to the greater progress in achieving a single market in goods than in services, demonstrat-
ing the complementarity between trade integration and ﬁnancial integration. In a model in
which ﬁrst-time cross-border direct investment involves a sunk cost, Russ (2007) shows the-
oretically and, using bank-level data, empirically that exchange rate volatility deters FDI.
Baldwin et al (2008) highlight that the Russ results apply in particular to the introduction
of the euro: the positive eﬀect of the single currency on cross-border M&A is primarily
due to novice ﬁrms undertaking cross-border investment for the ﬁrst time, rather than an
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along the extensive margin of investment parallels the role of the extensive margin in trade
dynamics, since much of the boost provided by the euro to trade takes the form of new
ﬁrms exporting and an expansion in the range of export destinations.
3.4 Banking
The retail banking market remains quite fragmented, with non-trivial diﬀerences in lending
and deposit rates for households and ﬁrms across the euro area.3 Figure 4 shows the cross-
sectional standard deviation in interest rates to small businesses and households over 2002-
2007, with the spreads showing relatively little convergence. Moreover, ECB data show
that the extent of cross-border lending to non-bank entities is quite small, constituting
only 5 percent of total loans to non-banks. While this share has grown from an average of
about 3 percent in the early years of EMU, the rate of increase is very slow. At one level,
this fragmentation is not too surprising, in view of the importance of local information in
assessing small-business and consumer loans and diﬀerences in national legal systems in
the enforcement of repayment and foreclosure procedures. In relation to retail payments,
ongoing high charges for cross-border payments have limited the tangible beneﬁts of a
single currency for bank customers. However, the 2008 launch of the Single Euro Payments
Area (SEPA) should help in providing a low-cost uniﬁed payments system that does not
discriminated between intra-national and cross-national payments within the euro area.
Even if retail banking remains fragmented, the banking sector has been a central driver
of ﬁnancial integration, through cross-border inter-bank loans and deposits and the area-
wide market in which banks are major cross-border purchasers of securities issued by other
banks. The scale of cross-border inter-bank lending and borrowing within the euro area far
exceeds the levels vis-a-vis nonbanks. This has transformed the balance sheets of banks in
the euro area. Cross-border interbank loans between euro area banks have grown from 15.5
percent percent of total inter-bank loans in 1997 to 23.5 percent in 2008, while the holdings
by euro area banks of the debt securities issued by banks in other euro area countries grew
from a 12.1 percent share in 1997 to 31.3 percent in 2008. The expansion of cross-border
activity has also included other EU countries, with the shares of inter-bank loans and debt
securities between the euro area and the rest of the EU growing from 10.3 percent and 1.4
percent respectively in 1997 to 18.6 percent and 11 percent in 2008.
In terms of econometric studies, Blank and Buch (2007) estimate a gravity model for
cross-border bank assets and liabilities. These authors ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive euro
eﬀect on the distribution of bank assets, with a weaker estimate obtained for bank lia-
bilities.4 Spiegel (2008a) shows that the sources of external ﬁnancing for Portuguese and
Greek banks radically shifted with the advent of EMU, with these banks traditionally re-
3The EU Banking Structures report (European Central Bank, 2008b) provides comprehensive data on
the European banking system.
4Coeurdacier and Martin (2007) also ﬁnd that a positive euro eﬀect on bilateral bank lending among
the member countries, in addition to increased lending by banks from outside the euro area to entitities in
the member countries.
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area. More generally, Spiegel (2008b) shows that the relative increase in bilateral bank
claims involving euro area members can be attributed to three diﬀerent channels: (a) a
“borrower” eﬀect, by which EMU membership increases creditworthiness such that EMU
members increase borrowing from all sources; (b) a “creditor” eﬀect that increases the at-
tractiveness of a member country’s banks as ﬁnancial intermediaries, with EMU members
increasing lending to all destinations; and (c) a “pairwise” eﬀect such that joint member-
ship of EMU increases the quality of intermediation when both lender and borrower are in
the monetary union, such that the increase in cross-border bank transactions is focused on
pairs of countries that are both members of EMU. He ﬁnds that the pairwise eﬀect is the
dominant factor in the data. Moreover, there is some evidence of an interaction eﬀect, by
which the pairwise eﬀect is strongest for those country pairs that also have high levels of
bilateral trade, such that the single currency reinforces bilateral links in which information
ﬂows are high.
Some of the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial integration may be obtained through foreign direct
investment in the banking sector, with large banks exploiting scale economies by operat-
ing in multiple national markets. Goldberg (2007) and De Blas and Russ (2008) provide
evidence that FDI in the ﬁnancial sector reduces lending rates through an increase in com-
petition and an improvement in cost eﬃciencies. Indeed, the relative importance of large
international banks has grown in recent years. As reported by the European Commission
(2008) and the European Central Bank (2007), there are 46 EU banking groups (out of a
total of 8,000 banks) that hold 68 percent of total EU banking assets. Of these, 16 major
banks hold at least 25 percent of their assets in other EU countries and are present in at
least 25 percent of other EU countries. These major banks have been important drivers of
enhanced ﬁnancial integration at the EU level.
However, consistent with the evidence provided by Aviat et al (2008), there is no evi-
dence of a euro eﬀect in cross-border merger and acquisitions in the banking sector. Rather,
cross-border banking consolidation can be explained by regional factors and global strate-
gies followed by some of the largest banking groups. This also lines up with the data re-
ported by the European Central Bank (2008b) which show that cross-border mergers and
acquisitions that involve euro area banks are evenly split between intra-union and extra-
union deals. This study also ﬁnds that the propensity to engage in cross-border deals is
increasing in the ownership share of foreign institutional investors, such that there is an
interesting complementarity between portfolio integration and integration in the banking
sector. Looking to the future, cross-border consolidation in the European banking sector
is likely to be a key agent of credit market integration. Accordingly, understanding the
barriers to such consolidation is a major research priority.
3.5 Trade in Financial Services
In an integrated ﬁnancial system, we may expect an increase in the cross-border provision
of ﬁnancial services. Table 5 shows the export and import data for ﬁnancial services in
1998 and 2006. For most countries, Table 5 shows that trade in ﬁnancial services has
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as an international ﬁnancial centre. Consistent with the evidence for the banking sector,
the generally low level of ﬁnancial trade reﬂects the lack of progress in promoting services
trade in Europe.
3.6 Summary on Financial Integration
The evidence reviewed in this section shows that EMU has been associated with a substan-
tial increase in cross-border ﬁnancial integration across the euro area, with both price-based
and volume-based measures pointing in this direction. In turn, greater ﬁnanical integra-
tion has stimulated ﬁnancial development across the euro area, through the lowering of
transactions costs and the expansion in the volumes of ﬁnancial assets.
That said, it is also clear that the process of ﬁnancial integration is far from complete,
with a range of real frictions and institutional factors slowing down the rate of progress
especially in relation to banking. Moreover, the current ﬁnancial crisis has led to some
degree of national segmentation of ﬁnancial systems. In part, the re-emergence of country-
speciﬁc factors reﬂects diﬀerential exposures to country-speciﬁc macroeconomic vulnera-
bilities. However, the dominant source of this segmentation surely relates to cross-country
diﬀerences in the design of government intervention in the ﬁnancial sector in response to
the international ﬁnancial crisis, including some asymmetries in the treatment of domestic-
versus foreign-owned ﬁnancial institutions. We return to the design of the ﬁnancial stability
framework in Section 5. In the next section, we turn to the analysis of the macroeconomic
impact of ﬁnancial integration.
4 Macroeconomic Impact
In analysing the macroeconomic impact of ﬁnancial integration, three major issues arise.
First, we may expect ﬁnancial integration to contribute to the ﬁnancial development of euro
area countries. Second, ﬁnancial integration has the potential to improve cross-border risk
sharing. Third, ﬁnancial integration may ease barriers to net capital ﬂows, leading to
increased dispersion in current account balances and net foreign asset positions. In this
section, we investigate each of these three predictions.
4.1 Financial Development
An extensive literature has shown that ﬁnancial development boosts income levels (see
Levine 2005 for a comprehensive survey of this literature, while Guiso et al 2004, Pa-
paioannou 2007 and Jappelli and Pagano 2008 provide European-focused reviews of the
links between ﬁnancial development and growth). In particular, the evidence from aggre-
gate and micro-level studies is that ﬁnancial development boosts total factor productivity
among the advanced economies, while it additionally promotes growth through lowering
10the cost of capital in emerging and developing economies.5 Accordingly, if cross-border
ﬁnancial integration positively contributes to ﬁnancial development, there is the potential
for a substantial long-term economic payoﬀ via the beneﬁts conferred by greater ﬁnancial
development.
Financial integration may promote ﬁnancial development through several mechanisms.
Deeper and more liquid ﬁnancial markets should lower the cost of capital through the
improved risk diversiﬁcation opportunities for investors and a decline in transactions costs
through greater volumes and greater specialisation in the provision of ﬁnancial services.
Moreover, the expansion of ﬁnancial markets improves the ﬁnancing choices faced by ﬁrms,
with a greater proportion no longer solely reliant on bank-based funding. In addition, the
evidence shows that greater ﬁnancial development improves the inter-sectoral allocation
of capital, with faster-growing sectors receiving more investment funding (Hartmann et
al 2007). The greater scope for risk diversiﬁcation also facilitates the funding of riskier
projects which may oﬀer the scope for higher long-term returns, as in the analysis of
Obstfeld (1994).
The impact of ﬁnancial integration on the banking sector is critically important. Again,
the scope for a more diversiﬁed loan book should improve the funding opportunities of
riskier and smaller ﬁrms. On the funding side, the potential depositor base is expanded,
while the development of integrated inter-bank and securities markets provides additional
channels of funding for banks. Financial integration should also increase the level of compe-
tition in national banking systems. In addition to the positive contribution to contestability
provided by cross-border lending (both directly for larger ﬁrms and indirectly via the im-
proved access to funding for smaller banks), the expansion of the most eﬃcient banks
through cross-border FDI (whether through the formation of new entities or via mergers
and acquisitions) oﬀers the scope for reduced costs and lower lending rates.
In summary, through the transformation of ﬁnancial markets and banking systems in
the direction of greater openness, ﬁnancial integration should improve the allocation of
capital, leading to improved productivity and innovation. Moreover, as is emphasised by
Guiso et al (2004), the potential beneﬁts should be greatest for those member countries
that entered monetary union with relatively under-developed ﬁnancial systems and those
sectors most reliant on external ﬁnance. However, the member countries with advanced
ﬁnancial systems should also beneﬁt by permitting domestic ﬁnancial ﬁrms to succeed in
the newly-expanded markets created by ﬁnancial integration.
In terms of evidence, the literature primarily relies on longer-term studies of the re-
lation between ﬁnancial development and economic performance, while maintaining the
assumption that ﬁnancial integration promotes ﬁnancial development. As pointed out by
Jappelli and Pagano (2008), it is diﬃcult to capture the full impact of ﬁnancial integration
and ﬁnancial development, since ﬁnancial integration may promote ﬁnancial development
by either allowing the domestic ﬁnancial system to expand or by allowing domestic ﬁrms
5There are many mechanisms by which ﬁnancial development may promote productivity growth and
there is an extensive literature that investigates each channel. For instance, Hartmann et al (2007) empha-
sise the role of ﬁnancial development in facilitating the reallocation of capital to faster-growing industries
and ﬁnd evidence in support of that channel.
11and households to bypass domestic intermediaries in favour of external partners.
However, there are several studies that have speciﬁcally examined the impact of the
euro on diﬀerent dimensions of ﬁnancial integration. Papaioannou and Portes (2008b)
estimate a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence model of the impact of the euro on the growth rates
of a set of ﬁnancial development indicators. These authors ﬁnd that the ratio of liquid
liabilities to GDP and narrow and broad measures of private sector credit grew signiﬁcantly
more quickly for member countries relative to non-members after the formation of EMU.
Moreover, these authors show that the medium-term impact has been stronger than the
short-term impact, such that the major gains in terms of ﬁnancial development took a few
years to materialise. In terms of convergence of ﬁnancial systems across the euro area,
Jappelli and Pagano (2008) note that bond market capitalisation has converged across the
euro area but there is less evidence that the euro has contributed to convergence in equity
market capitalisation or the ratio of private credit to GDP.
Bris et al (2007) show that EMU has boosted corporate valuations for ﬁrms in the euro
area. In particular, these authors show that Tobin’s Q increased by an average of 9 percent
over 1998-2004 for ﬁrms in the euro area relative to other ﬁrms. Moreover, the eﬀect
was strongest for ﬁrms from “weak currency” countries (that is, those member countries
that devalued during the 1992-1993 currency crisis), with Tobin’s Q increasing by 15.3
percent for this group. Their results also show that the eﬀect was relatively stronger for
ﬁrms whose stock returns were historically negatively correlated with the exchange rate.
In terms of the underlying components, the increase in Tobin’s Q can be attributed in
part to a reduction in the risk-free rate (due to a more credible monetary environment),
a reduction in market risk premia (due to the elimination of bilateral currency risk within
the euro area and improved risk sharing due to the expansion of the investor base) and an
increase in expected cash ﬂows (for instance, due to expanded trade opportunities).
In turn, there is evidence that ﬁrms have responded by increasing the level of investment.
Using industry-level data, Dvorak (2006) shows that the introduction of the euro boosted
the level of investment in member countries relative to non-members over 1998 to 2003.
Moreover, in line with a priori expectations, Dvorak ﬁnds that the eﬀect is strongest for
those sectors most dependent on external ﬁnance and resident in the least ﬁnancially-
developed member countries.
Finally, the literature on ﬁnancial development in emerging market economies and de-
veloping countries has emphasised that episodes of major ﬁnancial liberalisation frequently
involve a crisis phase in which excess debt levels lead to banking and currency crises. The
evidence of Ranciere et al (2008) is that liberalisation still raises long-term growth even
accounting for such “bumpiness”. In similar fashion, the current ﬁnancial crisis may be in
part attributed to the radical shift in the ﬁnancial environment associated with the major
increase in ﬁnancial integration over the last decade. Of course, it remains too early to tell
whether this crisis will overshadow the putative long-term gains from increased ﬁnancial
development in Europe. Relative to the country experience in other episodes, a major
diﬀerence is that debt liabilities are predominantly denominated in euro, such that the
banking crisis is not being accompanied by a currency crisis.
124.2 International Risk Sharing
A key hope is that ﬁnancial integration improves the extent of cross-border risk sharing. In
principle, international risk diversiﬁcation can serve as an alternative stabilisation mecha-
nism, since domestic wealth and consumption may be insulated from domestic production
and asset shocks. Moreover, if consumption dynamics are similar across the euro area, the
coherence of a single monetary policy is improved. Increased risk sharing may also improve
the long-run growth rate of the economy, since expanded hedging opportunities should
encourage entrepreneurs to pursue riskier projects that may oﬀer higher payoﬀs (Obstfeld
1994).
Holding other factors constant, the increase in cross-border investment positions should
have increased risk sharing within the euro area. At the microeconomic level, it is surely the
case that the personal ﬁnancial portfolios and pension fund assets of households are more
internationally diversiﬁed than in the pre-EMU era.6 For the corporate sector, the increase
in foreign direct investment means that earnings are more geographically diversiﬁed. For
banks, cross-border assets now consitute a greater fraction of total assets. Moreover, the
increase in ﬁnancial development also increases the scope for risk sharing. A greater share
of wealth is now tradable, due to the capitalisation of income streams that is facilitated
by ﬁnancial development. Accordingly, the capacity of individuals to share risks within
borders and across borders is positively related to the extent of ﬁnancial development.
It is diﬃcult to empirically measure the macroeconomic extent of risk sharing, especially
in the context of less than ten years of data for the euro area. Under certain conditions, the
correlation in consumption growth rates provides an indicator of international risk sharing.7
Figure 5 plots the cross-country standard deviation of consumption growth across the Euro
12 group of countries. While the dispersion in consumption growth rates is certainly lower
in the post-1999 period relative to the 1970s, it is diﬃcult to discern any clear shift in
the pattern relative to the 1980s and 1990s, despite the massive increase in cross-border
ﬁnancial integration over the last decade.
Of course, there is a limit to what can be learned from simple unconditional correla-
tions. A popular approach has been to investigate the conditional dependence of domestic
consumption on domestic output ﬂuctuations. In an endowment economy under ﬁnancial
autarky, consumption is perfectly correlated with domestic output. International risk shar-
ing provides one mechanism that can break the link between domestic consumption and
domestic output and an active line of research measures the covariance between domes-
tic consumption and domestic output as a rough proxy of the extent of international risk
sharing. More precisely, this approach typically runs a regression of the form
∆logcit − ∆logct = α + βt (∆logGDPit − ∆logGDPt) + εit (3)
where cit is country i’s level of consumption in year t and ct is the aggregate level of
6See Jappelli and Pistaferri (2008) for an analysis of the impact of the euro on the portfolios of Italian
households.
7Note on Backus-Smith condition.
13consumption for the group of countries in the sample and βt measures the average co-
movement of the idiosyncratic component of consumption with the idiosyncratic component
of GDP growth.Accordingly, the degree of consumption insurance is measured by (1− ˆ βt).
Demyanyk et al (2008) provide an extensive review of this literature and test whether
EMU has altered the β coeﬃcient for members of the euro area. Their results indicate no
improvement in consumption risk sharing among the EMU member countries during the
post-1999 period. However, these authors do ﬁnd that “income risk sharing” has improved
among this group after 1999: the pass-through from gross domestic product shocks to
gross national income has declined. This is consistent with increasing ﬁnancial integration
since gross investment income ﬂows are increasing in the scale of cross-border investment
positions and are a component of gross national income but not of gross domestic product
(Figure 6 shows the rapid increase in gross investment income ﬂows for the Euro 12 group
in recent years). However, their analysis ﬁnds little direct support for a role for measures
of ﬁnancial integration in explaining the patterns of consumption or income risk sharing
during this period.
Gerlach and Hoﬀmann (2008) pursue an alternative empirical strategy by examining
bilateral comovements in consumption among pairs of advanced economies. Their empirical
speciﬁcation is
∆logcit − ∆logcjt = φij + δt + β(∆logGDPit − ∆logGDPjt) + εijt (4)
with
β = β0 + β1EXTRAij + β2INTRAij (5)
where EXTRAij is 0-1 dummy which scores 1 if only one country is a member of the euro
area, INTRAij is a 0-1 dummy which scores 1 if countries i and j are both members of
the euro area. A decrease in β is consistent with an improvement in bilateral risk sharing,
with a decrease in β1 suggesting improved risk sharing between EMU members and outside
countries and a decline in β2 showing the extent of improved risk sharing among pairs of
EMU member countries. Using consumption and GDP data from the Penn World Tables
over 1990 to 2004, these authors ﬁnd that β1 and β2 declined during 1999-2004 relative to
1990-1998. We conﬁrm their ﬁnding at a qualitative level in column (1) of Table 6, even if
the changes are not statistically signiﬁcant. Moreover, this pattern continues to hold when
we extend the time period to 2006 by extending the Penn World Tables data with data
from the United Nations in column (2). However, if the United Nations data are used for
the whole sample in columns (3) and (4), the β1 and β2 coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant for
the 1999-2006 period.
Jappelli and Pistaferri (2008) pursue an alternative empirical approach by examining
consumption smoothing across Italian households. These authors investigate whether the
capacity to smooth consumption in the face of income shocks has improved after the intro-
duction of the euro but reject that the euro has decreased the sensitivity of consumption
to income shocks.
The mixed nature of the results from these studies serves to highlight that establishing
the impact of EMU on risk sharing faces several complications. First, even aside from the
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of international ﬁnancial integration that is relevant for tests of risk sharing. For instance,
gross levels of foreign assets and liabilities (and/or gross ﬂows of investment income credits
and debits) face the linkage problem that many types of international ﬁnancial positions
generate an intimate connection between returns on foreign assets and returns on foreign
liabilities. For instance, a bank in country i may have an aﬃliate in country j and obtain
FDI earnings in line with the proﬁts of the aﬃliate. However, in turn, the shares of
the bank in country i may be predominantly owned by foreign portfolio investors, such
that an increase in FDI earnings is oﬀset by some combination of an increase in portfolio
equity investment income debits (if the bank raises its dividend to shareholders) or an
increase in foreign liabilities (if the increase in proﬁts is embedded in the market value of
the bank). Even more mechanically, a signiﬁcant proportion of cross-border investment
positions represent trades by ﬁnancial intermediaries. For instance, foreign investors may
own shares in a mutual fund that is resident in country j, where the mutual fund exclusively
holds foreign portfolio assets. In this case, an increase in the value of the mutual fund
represents a symmetric increase in foreign assets (the foreign assets held by the mutual
fund) and foreign liabilities (the ownership shares in the mutual fund that are held by
foreign investors).
Second, as was argued above, the introduction of the euro was an important stimulus to
ﬁnancial liberalisation in several member countries, with a sharp reduction in real interest
rates and a relaxation of credit constraints. In these countries, it was rational for the
level of consumption to increase in response to the change in the credit environment. In
some cases, the scale of the adjustment in consumption was ampliﬁed by a local asset price
boom, especially in residential and commercial property sectors. Since these assets were
predominantly owned by domestic residents, these national asset price booms primarily
raised domestic wealth and, together with the relaxation in borrowing constraints, have
been a factor contributing to a divergence in wealth and consumption dynamics across the
euro area.
Figure 7 shows the dispersion in house price dynamics across the euro area over 1997-
2007. Peripheral member countries such as Ireland, Spain and Greece experienced cu-
mulative house price increases of 342 percent, 289 percent and 241 percent respectively.
In contrast, housing price growth in Germany and Austria was much more modest at 95
percent and 105 percent respectively. In view of such dispersion in housing wealth growth
during this period, it is hardly surprising that national consumption growth rates have not
converged.
More generally, the relaxation of credit constraints means greater scope for the de-
linking of consumption and income through international borrowing and lending. This
mechanism does not constitute risk sharing but just involves the intertemporal redistribu-
tion of consumption. While it can improve welfare by promoting consumption smoothing,
the capacity to borrow and lend internationally can also lead to over-borrowing scenarios
if other frictions mean that consumption decisions are distorted. Moreover, even if inter-
national risk sharing is promoted by geographical diversiﬁcation, an increased capacity to
15engage in cross-border borrowing may increase sectoral risk to the extent that domestic
ﬁrms in given sectors increase leverage to expand overseas and domestic property investors
build on domestic capital gains to acquire debt-ﬁnanced international property portfolios.8
Furthermore, the largest increase in cross-border investment positions within the euro
area has been in debt assets that are very close substitutes for domestic debt assets. Ac-
cordingly, the extent of diversiﬁcation provided by these investments is quite limited. In-
deed, the elimination of nominal assets that provide payoﬀs in national currencies may
actually have reduced the scope of diversiﬁcation, to the extent that historical payoﬀs on
domestically-denominated debt instruments systematically co-moved with domestic macro-
economic conditions (Neumeyer 1998).
Member countries have also increased the scale of international investments in non-
member countries. While this in itself may contribute to global risk sharing, heterogeneity
across the member countries in the geographical and sectoral patterns of international
investment means that these external investments may reduce the similarity of wealth
dynamics within the euro area. Indeed, this mechanism has been emphasised an impor-
tant factor in the decision of the United Kingdom not to join EMU (HM Treasury 2003).
Examples include the importance of Central and Eastern Europe as a direct investment
destination for Austrian banks and Latin America for Spanish and Portuguese ﬁrms, while
the scale of Ireland’s direct investment liabilities vis-a-vis the United States is especially
striking.
Table 3 shows that the growth in international investment positions has been quite
heterogeneous across the euro area, even ignoring the outsized statistics for the major
ﬁnancial-processing centres of Ireland and Luxembourg. Moreover, Table 4 also shows
that the relative importance of the euro area as a destination for portfolio investment
shows considerable variation across the member countries. Accordingly, member countries
are asymmetrically exposed to international ﬁnancial shocks, such that the variation in
international ﬁnancial integration can act as a source of disharmony under some scenarios.
Fourth, a host of real frictions limit the true scope for international risk sharing. At a
general level, the literature on limited enforceability and contract incompleteness provides
strong theoretical reasons as to why production risk cannot be completely diversiﬁed. More-
over, ﬁnancial transaction costs are non-trivial. For instance, in relation to the issuance of
securities, scale factors are important, such that smaller ﬁrms are not proportionately rep-
resented on public markets. For private ﬁnancing, informational asymmetries and contract
enforcement issues mean that local ﬁnanciers have a comparative advantage over external
investors. More generally, the non-tradability of claims on labour income limits the extent
of domestic and international risk sharing, such that even perfectly-diversiﬁed ﬁnancial
portfolios would not necessarily hedge macroeconomic risks. Finally, as is emphasised by
a growing literature, the importance of non-tradables and domestically-produced tradable
8A good example is provided by the Irish situation. Many domestic households used a combination
of equity release from the large capital gains earned on owner-occupied housing to buy overseas holiday
homes and buy-to-let properties across Europe, the United States and further aﬁeld. In similar fashion,
commercial property developers leveraged domestic proﬁts to aggressively invest in commercial property,
especially in the United Kingdom.
16goods in consumption means that domestic and foreign households may choose quite dif-
ferent portfolios, since consumption risks diﬀer across countries (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 2001,
Obstfeld 2007, Coeurdacier 2008).
Finally, it is possible that the risk sharing gains from increased ﬁnancial integration
may not show up in data over a relatively short interval such as a decade. In particular,
the main gain from international risk sharing may be in terms of diversiﬁcation vis-a-vis
large-scale rare disasters.9 To the extent that such adverse rare events are country-speciﬁc
in nature, the increase in cross-border asset positions provides useful insurance even if it is
rarely called upon.
4.3 Net Capital Movements
Along another dimension, ﬁnancial integration may also alter the dynamics of net capital
movements. Net ﬂows have the potential to improve welfare through two main channels:
(a) the allocation of capital to the most productive uses; and (b) the smoothing of con-
sumption during the convergence process and in the event of temporary macroeconomic
shocks. In relation to the capital allocation function, monetary union eliminates the na-
tional currency risk that historically posed a major risk to investment returns, especially
in relation to the risk of episodic currency crises. At one level, greater eﬃciency in capital
allocation should allow countries to converge more rapidly to steady-state output levels. At
the cylical frequency, as was emphasised by the real business cycle literature, it should also
increase the responsiveness to productivity shocks, possibly amplifying the local business
cycles.
One form of consumption smoothing relates to the convergence process, since the
prospect of higher future incomes stimulates an increase in current consumption. In re-
lation to temporary shocks, the welfare cost of cyclical ﬂuctuations is ameliorated by the
capability to insulate consumption from excessive ﬂuctuations. The impact of monetary
union on cyclical consumption smoothing should be greatest for those countries that histor-
ically were characterized by a low level of domestic ﬁnancial development and pro-cyclical
access to credit (as is the standard pattern for emerging market economies).
In relation to consumption smoothing, the ability to borrow and lend in response to
shocks has been particularly enhanced by participation in an integrated wholesale banking
market and the growth in multi-country banks. Banks play a critical role since small ﬁrms
and households primarily raise external ﬁnance through the banking system. Accordingly,
a more developed banking system that is populated by diversiﬁed banks will be better
able to provide stable ﬁnancing in the event of shocks. As is emphasised by Demyanyk
et al (2007, 2008), the evidence from the United States is that the deregulation of the US
banking system in relation to restrictions on cross-state banking activity has substantially
improved the smoothing of personal incomes, especially for small business owners. At the
international level, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) highlight the role of internal capital mar-
kets within global banks in smoothing national liquidity shocks. Moreover, such channels
9The literature on rare disasters and asset pricing is growing rapidly. See Barro (2006) amongst others.
17contribute to the stabilisation of output in addition to the smoothing of income by weak-
ening the impact of the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism on the production and investment
decisions of ﬁrms.
However, in the presence of other distortions, a more elastic supply of external capital
may lead to over-borrowing. In relation to governments, political economy factors may
generate a temptation to borrow more in order to increase public spending or cut taxation;
however, the ﬁscal restraints built into the Maastricht Treaty and embodied in the Growth
and Stability Pact curb that tendency. For banks and near-banks, poorly-designed regula-
tions or inadequate supervision may encourage excessive lending on the back of funds raised
through the wholesale market or securitisation.10 For corporates, if the corporate gover-
nance environment is inadequate, international leveraging may tempt some executives to
undertake excessive investment or make ill-advised acquisitions. Under these scenarios, cap-
ital ﬂows magnify the impact of such distortions and may amplify cyclical shocks through
a pro-cyclical pattern in capital ﬂows.
Figure 8 shows the cross-sectional dispersion of current account balances for the EMU
12 group of countries over 1970 to 2007, while Figure 9 shows the dispersion in accumulated
net international investment positions. While large current account imbalances were run
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, these proved to be very temporary in nature, with large
deﬁcits typically closed through a crisis episode. In contrast, the increase in dispersion in
current account balances over the last decade has been associated with highly-persistent net
ﬂows for certain countries. Table 7 shows that the persistence of current account balances
has drifted upwards and that persistence within the euro area since 1999 is signiﬁcantly
higher than among non-member advanced countries.11
Moreover, as is shown by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), the link between net ﬂows
and income levels has strengthened under EMU, with the lower-income countries typically
running large current account deﬁcits. Fagan and Gaspar (2007) provide a model of how
EMU led to a major increase in the current account deﬁcits of those member countries
that may have been expected to grow relatively quickly for convergence reasons and that
historically operated under credit constraints. For these countries, the advent of EMU
was associated with a reduction in real interest rates and a major increase in cross-border
borrowing. While such factors help to explain the emergence of persistent current account
deﬁcits, it is also possible that access to external capital contributed to excessive expansion
in the property sector in some countries and to an unsustainable increase in local asset
prices.
The emergence of large and persistent current account imbalances within the euro area
also raises important adjustment issues, especially to the extent that deﬁcits have been
used to ﬁnance consumption or investment in low-productivity sectors. While monetary
union may insulate a member country from speculative attacks on a national currency,
10Historically, politically-connected non-banks may have also been tempted to over borrow, in the belief
that the government would provide a rescue package in the event of trouble. However, EU restrictions on
state aids sharply limit the scope for the bail out of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
11The non-EMU group consist of Australia, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Israel, Japan, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.
18the real exchange rate depreciation that is a typical part of the adjustment to increase in
net external liabilities cannot be achieved through nominal depreciation. Moreover, there
is increasing evidence that nominal depreciation oﬀers a double beneﬁt for the external
balance sheet of a debtor economy. In addition to the presumed positive impact on the trade
balance (albeit with a lag), nominal depreciation that is not fully oﬀset by a diﬀerential in
expected returns also generates a positive valuation eﬀect to the extent that foreign assets
are disproportionately in foreign currency and foreign liabilities in domestic currency. For
instance, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) ﬁnd a substantial role for the currency-based valuation
channel in the adjustment dynamics of the United States (see also Tille 2003 and Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti 2005). The absence of independent national currencies means that this
valuation channel does not play a role in the adjustment dynamics of the member countries
of the euro area, at least in relation to intra-area imbalances.
Moreover, real depreciation vis-a-vis other member countries can only be achieved
through a negative inﬂation diﬀerential. Accordingly, this requires wages to grow more
slowly than in other member countries, which is diﬃcult to achieve if the institutional
environment governing the domestic labour market does not facilitate rapid corrections in
wage levels. Moreover, a drawn-out period of anticipated real depreciation can amplify the
negative impact on domestic activity, since the ex-ante real interest rate will be higher, de-
pressing domestic spending. The slow pace of adjustment in Portugal in correcting its large
current account deﬁcit and loss of external competitiveness shows the diﬃculties involved
in external adjustment under EMU (Blanchard 2007). Moreover, there is evidence that
the sensitivity of wages to the level of competitiveness is also weak in some other member
countries (Honohan and Leddin 2006).
We also note that the prominence of inter-bank lending as a source of ﬁnance for current
account deﬁcits within the euro area means that a version of the “sudden stop” mechanism
is a potential risk. If banks in a given deﬁcit country are unable to rollover short-term
debt, the current account deﬁcit may quickly close in a manner that is compounded by a
domestic banking crisis. While the generalised nature of the 2007-2008 ﬁnancial turmoil
has permitted the European Central Bank to provide liquidity support to all banks in the
euro area, a similar response would not necessarily apply in the context of a country-speciﬁc
problem. While national governments have intervened to providesupport to domesticbanks
during the current crisis, it is too early to tell whether this will be suﬃcient to avert a sharp
reversal in capital ﬂows to major deﬁcit countries in the euro area.
Accordingly, the external adjustment process for member countries is potentially quite
challenging. However, it is important to keep in mind the appropriate counterfactual. In
particular, it is not so obvious that a ﬂoating exchange rate is automatically helpful in
faciliating adjustment. As the current international ﬁnancial crisis reminds us, a deﬁcit
country may also be vulnerable to a currency attack especially during a period of inter-
national turmoil, with currency and ﬁnancial crises feeding on each other. Moreover, the
beggar-thy-neighbour characteristics of independent monetary responses to crisis situations
were an important motivation for the formation of EMU, since free trade and cooperation
on other economic and political issues is diﬃcult to sustain if nominal exchange rates are
19subject to manipulation (Eichengreen 1993).
5 Conclusions
The evidence is that the ﬁrst ten years of EMU has generated a remarkable increase in
ﬁnancial integration, even if it the extent of convergence varies across diﬀerent sectors
within the overall ﬁnancial system. However, it is also clear that there remain many
outstanding barriers to full integration. In relation to technical frictions, initiatives such
as SEPA, Target-2, the proposed integration of securities settlement with the payments
system(T2S) and thenewversion 2 of the Correspondent Central Banking System (CCBS2)
should improve the support infrastructure to enable greater progress in achieving deeper
and broader ﬁnancial integration.12
Further ﬁnancial integration is also dependent on the success of moves to improve
the European ﬁnancial stability framework and the system for the supervision of large
multi-country banks. The tension between the internationalisation of banking activity and
national responsibility for ﬁnancial stability was evident from the outset of EMU (see,
amongst others, Begg et al 1999 and Portes 2001). Indeed, considerable eﬀorts have been
made to promote cooperation and coordination between the diﬀerent national systems in
order to make this approach operate in an eﬀective manner but the 2007-2008 interna-
tional ﬁnancial crisis has illustrated the limits to voluntary cooperation and the potential
for “beggar-thy-neighbour” interventions. Accordingly, the current crisis clearly signals the
imperative of establishing a truly pan-European mechanism to cope with stresses in the
ﬁnancial system. However, the viability of an area-wide regime faces the limitation that
the provision of ﬁnancial stability ultimately requires a ﬁscal backstop and the political ac-
ceptability of pooling ﬁscal resources is open to question. The current crisis has also vividly
highlighted the global interdependence of ﬁnancial systems, such that the internationalisa-
tion of the ﬁnancial stability function requires improved coordination mechanisms at the
global level, in addition to making progress in respect of the intra-European dimension.
A major focus of this paper has been to analyse the impact of increased ﬁnancial integra-
tion on the macroeconomic behaviour of the member countries. There is a presumption
that ﬁnancial integration promotes ﬁnancial development and thereby contributes to a
higher long-run level of productivity and the initial evidence provides encouraging support
for this channel. However, a decade of data is not long enough to establish conclusive
evidence on contribution of the euro to ﬁnancial development, such that this area requires
ongoing research attention. Moreover, the current crisis is sure to complicate the analysis
of the contribution of expanded capital markets to long-term macroeconomic performance,
since the full impact cannot be assessed until recovery is fully established.
In relation to international diversiﬁcation, we have highlighted that there is little evi-
dence to support that EMU has generated a substantial increase in the cross-border sharing
of macroeconomic risks. This should not be interpreted as a surprising outcome, in view
12See European Central Bank (2008) for a comprehensive description of the ESCB’s role in fostering
further ﬁnancial integration.
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peripheral member countries have enjoyed a sustained decline in risk premia and large
credit booms. However, over the longer term, the contribution of increased cross-border
investment positions to risk sharing may well show up more strongly in the data. The
third macroeconomic dimension that we covered was to argue that EMU has allowed some
member countries to run persistent current account deﬁcits. While this may well accel-
erate convergence in income levels, the improved access to external credit may also have
contributed to over-investment in property and unsustainable increases in domestic asset
prices in some membership countries. Moreover, membership of a monetary union also
alters the external adjustment process such that the transition from trade deﬁcits to trade
surpluses may be more prolonged than under a ﬂoating exchange rate.
Finally, EMUover the next decade is set to undergo further transformation over the next
decade, with the entry of increasing numbers of the new EU member states.13 The analysis
in this paper suggests that the euro has the greatest ﬁnancial impact on those member
countries with initially less-developed ﬁnancial systems. Accordingly, as is projected by
Masten et al (2008), joining the euro area should accelerate the ﬁnancial development of the
new member states. In addition, conditional on possessing a high degree of macroeconomic
and ﬁscal stability upon entry to EMU, the euro area should be a safe haven for the new
member states relative to the diﬃculties involved in managing an ﬂoating exchange rate in a
world of high capital mobility. Finally, the enlargement of the euro area further reinforces
the urgency to improve the European ﬁnancial stability framework, in view of the risks
posed by the increased heterogeneity in banking systems across the euro area.
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Figure 2: Outstanding Securities Issued by Non-MFI corporations. Source: Author’s cal-
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Figure 3: Cross-Border Ownership of Euro Long-Term Debt. Note: . Source: European
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Figure 5: Dispersion of Consumption Growth Rates, 1970-2007. Note: Cross-country


















































Figure 6: Investment Income Flows, 1970-2006. Note: Ratios to GDP, median of Euro 12
group of countries. Source: Author’s calculations, based on data from the IMF’s Balance
of Payments Statistics database.
32Figure 7: Cumulative House Price Increases, 1997-2007. Source: Author’s calculations















































Standard Deviation of Current Account Balances
Figure 8: Dispersion of Current Account Balances, 1970-2007. Note: Standard deviation of
CA/GDP ratio for Euro 12 group of countries (excluding Luxembourg). Source: Author’s

















































Standard Deviation of NFA positions
Figure 9: Dispersion of NFA positions, 1970 to 2006. Note: Standard deviation of
NFA/GDP ratios for Euro 12 group (excluding Luxembourg). Source: Author’s calculations
based on an extended version of the “External Wealth of Nations” dataset documented in
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
35Table 1: Share of Domestic Counter-Parties in Money Market Business
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Unsecured money market 28.2 32.9 34.5 31.5 25.3 28.2
Repo money market 42.9 35.8 37.7 36.6 28.1 40.0
Short-term securities 32.2 54.9 39.7 46.8 37.9 47.8
Forward Rate Agreements 12.3 18.0 18.0 21.4 24.4
Foreign exchange swaps 19.2 22.9 20.9 19.2 27.1 25.0
Interest rate swaps 26.6 20.2 22.1 20.3 21.3 24.4
Overnight interest rate swaps 16.9 14.6 21.5 22.7 22.08 24.5
Cross-currency swaps 22.9 11.8 24.5 19.7 17.4 13.2
Percentage of euro money market business done with domestic counterparties. Source:
ECB Money Market Survey (ECB Statistical Data Warehouse).
36Table 2: Issuance of Euro Securities by Non-Euro Countries
1998 2007
United States 9.9 15.9
















Share of Euro-denominated securities in total outstanding securities. *: 1996. Source:
Author’s calculations based on data from Bank of International Settlements.
37Table 3: International Financial Integration
1997 2001 2006
FA FL FA FL FA FL
Austria 78.5 95.2 137.0 163.0 258.4 283.7
Belgium 241.6 211.6 331.8 281.6 488.2 453.6
Finland 56.7 97.0 128.2 209.1 213.3 226.5
France 117.3 108.1 180.1 167.4 287.0 281.5
Germany 81.2 77.5 140.6 133.6 197.8 175.0
Greece 36.8 51.3 39.3 79.6 62.0 139.8
Ireland 313.8 299.7 724.0 734.3 1187.7 1194.4
Italy 67.4 73.8 94.5 101.4 128.8 145.2
Luxembourg 5118.4 5013.4 7705.9 7636.1 11984.5 11840.0
Netherlands 162.8 186.3 307.0 322.2 443.8 445.0
Portugal 84.4 100.8 133.4 184.7 179.6 266.3
Spain 55.4 71.6 99.8 127.1 140.7 200.8
Foreign assets and foreign liabilities as ratios to GDP. Source: Updated version of External
Wealth of Nations database reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
38Table 4: Share of Euro Area in Cross-Border Portfolio Assets
Debt Equity
1997 2001 2006 1997 2001 2006
Austria 46.7 62.0 65.5 50.2 53.5 55.6
Belgium 59.8 74.9 77.4 84.1 78.9 79.7
Finland 28.7 75.1 74.6 34.9 31.1 38.8
France 45.2 58.9 66.8 39.3 51.1 50.5
Germany 46.9 65.0 66.6 39.2 59.7 69.6
Greece 33.5 30.7 50.1 43.0
Ireland 42.6 43.8 48.4 13.9 18.5 26.8
Italy 19.7 49.5 64.9 55.6 64.3 79.2
Luxembourg 60.4 57.4 37.0 33.6
Netherlands 68.5 66.7 69.3 22.7 26.5 25.6
Portugal 43.2 57.1 60.6 54.0 65.5 67.3
Spain 27.6 67.0 56.8 45.8 54.2 77.0
Note: Author’s calculations based on data from the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Invest-
ment Survey and the Bundesbank.
39Table 5: Trade in Financial Services
1998 1998 2006 2006
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Austria 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.5
Belgium 1.1 1.0
France 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3
Germany 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3
Italy 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2
Luxembourg 84.3 44.3
Netherlands 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Finland 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
Greece 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4
Ireland 0.3 1.1 8.6 6.2
Portugal 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
Spain 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5
Switzerland 3.1 0.2 4.4 0.4
United Kingdom 1.6 0.3 2.4 0.5
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from OECD Services Trade database. Data
are expressed as ratios to GDP.
40Table 6: Bilateral Consumption Co-Movements.
PWT PWT Hybrid UN UN
1990-98 1999-04 1999-06 1990-98 1999-06
β0 0.83 0.95 0.96 0.72 0.77
[0.02]*** [0.06]*** [0.05]*** [0.02]*** [0.04]***
β1 -0.16 -0.21 -0.15 -0.11 0.04
[0.03]*** [0.06]*** [0.05]*** [0.03]*** [0.04]
β2 -0.24 -0.28 -0.23 -0.16 0.02
[0.03]*** [0.06]*** [0.05]*** [0.03]*** [0.05]
Observations 2277 1518 2024 2277 2024
See equation (4) in the text. *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1 percent level. PWT: Penn
World Tables.
41Table 7: Current Account Persistence
1980-1989 1990-1998 1999-2007
EMU
δ 0.59 0.67 0.81
[7.6]*** [8.5]*** [11.3]***
Observations 105 108 108
Non-EMU
δ 0.43 0.64 0.59
[4.7]*** [7.7]*** [8.1]***
Observations 108 108 108
Fixed-eﬀects panel regressions CAit = αi + δCAit−1 + εit. *** denotes signiﬁcance at 1
percent level. Data source: World Economic Outlook database.
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